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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION
The concept of self-determination presents a useful example of how
change comes about in legal norms, particularly in the international arena.
Most scholars recognize self-determination as a concept that has already
undergone considerable transformation. This paper will try, again, to grasp the
evolving nettle of self-determination in light of the recent events in Kosovo and
East Timor. Nettles may sting if not handled properly, but they also have a
range of restorative properties. Struggles for self-determination tend to inflict
injury or loss, but the pain is usually considered worth bearing if it results in
larger measures of autonomy for the group initiating the struggle. The
progressions in the development of the concept of self-determination have often
been noted:' the steps proceed from Wilsonian pronouncement, to United
Nations Charter inclusion, through the overthrow of colonialism to the
development of individual and group human rights generally; they move
towards the increasing specificity of the right, first to participate in governance
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.
I. See, e.g., Valerie Epps, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 433 (1997).
446 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:445
and then to participate fully in the life of the nation; they continue through
examination of the characteristics of the groups that may claim non-full
participation, culminating in a declared right of "full autonomy" or even a right
of "secession" for groups not fully experiencing participation in the larger
society.
11. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S REFERENCE OPINION ON QUEBEC'S
RIGHT TO SECESSION
A recent opinion from the Supreme Court of Canada2 presented a rare
judicial opinion on the international law surrounding the issue of self-
determination and secession. In the summer of 1998, the Court issued a
reference opinion answering, among other things, the following question:
Does international law give the National Assembly, legislative or
government of Quebec the right to effect secession of Quebec from
Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determina-
tion under international law that would give the National Assembly,
legislative or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession
of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?3
Though the Court was willing to concede the right of a people to self-
determination as a general principle of international law, the Court stated that
the right must "be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing
sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial
integrity of those states."' In general then, the right of self-determination,
whatever it may mean and whoever may claim it, can usually only be exercised
within the framework of the existing state structure. The Court did, however,
go on to say that it is only in "exceptional circumstances [that] a right of
secession may arise."5 Before addressing those circumstances, the Court turned
its attention to defining the "peoples" who may claim the right to self-
determination.
The Court's discussion of the definition of "peoples" never really got off
the ground because the Court decided that it was "not necessary to explore this
legal characterization"6 because, regardless of the correct definition, the Court
was not willing to find that the Quebec population had a unilaterally right to
secession. The Court did not explore the question of whether the population of
2. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 Can. S.C.R. 217 (1998) (hereinafter Secession of Quebec].
3. Id. 1 2.
4. Id. 122.
5. Id.
6. Id. 125.
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Quebec was a "people" for the purposes of claiming self-determination because,
even if they were, the Court remained convinced that the circumstances
necessary to trigger the right of self-determination, in the sense of secession,
did not exist in Quebec. The Court did note however that "a people" may
include "only a portion of the population of an existing state,"7 thus recognizing
that the right of self-determination, including the right of secession in certain
circumstances, may attach to certain sectors of the population located within a
larger territorial unit of the state.
The Court noted that self-determination will normally be "fulfilled through
internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social,
and cultural development within the framework of an existing state"' and that
the "right to external self-determination (which [may take] the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of
cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances."9
The Court cited the 1989 concluding document of the Vienna Meeting of
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the follow-up to the
Helsinki Final Act which referred to "peoples having the right to determine
'their internal and external political status',"l° but noted that the statement of
this right is "immediately followed by express recognition that" the state will
always act in conformity with the United Nations Charter including those
principles relating to territorial integrity of states. The states participating in
the Vienna Meeting specifically stated in Principle 5 of the concluding
document that any action aimed "at violating the territorial integrity, political
independence or unity of a state"'2 will not be recognized as legal by the
participating states. Leading scholars have interpreted this to mean that "no
territorial or other change can be brought about by the central authorities of a
State that is contrary to the will of the whole people of that State."'3 The Court
concluded that a:
[S]tate whose government represents the whole of the people or
peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and
without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determina-
7. Secession of Quebec, supra note 2, 1 124. The Court also stated that it was not "necessary to
examine the position of the aboriginal population within Quebec." Id. 125.
8. Id. 'i 126. (Emphasis added).
9. Id. (Emphasis added).
10. Id. 1 129. (Emphasis applied).
11. Succession of Quebec, supra note 2, 1 129.
12. Id.
13. A. Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A LegalReappraisal, at 287 (Cambridge University
Press) (1995).
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tion in its own internal arrangements, is entitled to the protection
under international law of its territorial integrity.
14
What then are the "extreme cases" in "defined circumstances"' 5 that may
justify piercing the territorial integrity of the state framework? The Court lists
three examples of a people's right to secession. It is ready to agree that the
"right of colonial peoples to exercise their right to self-determination by
breaking away from the 'imperial' power is now undisputed."' 6 Similarly,
where a people "is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation
outside a colonial context,"' 7 there is a right to external self-determination.
Lastly the Court gives credence to the proposition that "when a people is
blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination
internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession,"' 8 although
that proposition may not yet be "an established international law standard."' 9
The problem for Quebec was that, in the Court's view, the province does
not fit within any of the above three "extreme cases." The Court documents the
dominant position of Quebecers in national politics, in the legislative, judicial,
and executive branches of government and concludes that since Quebecers are
in no way in "a disadvantaged position,"'2 the "exceptional circumstances
[giving rise to a right to secession] are manifestly inapplicable to Quebec."'"
The Court is therefore quite clear in its view that Quebec, at the present time,
has no right under international law to unilateral secession.
The last part of the Court's opinion addresses what it calls the Recognition
of a Factual/Political Reality: The 'Effectivity' Principle.22 Here the Court
demonstrates its appreciation that the world does not necessarily arrange, or
rearrange, itself according to legal rights. The Court recognizes that "interna-
tional law may well, depending on the circumstances, adapt to recognize a
political and/or factual reality, regardless of the legality of the steps leading to
its creation."'2 The Court is fully aware that if a clear majority of Quebecers
voted, on a clear question, for secession, the federal government of Canada
would have to negotiate with the leaders of Quebec and that there might
eventually be recognition of an independent Quebec both by Canada and by
14. Id. 1130.
15. See Secession of Quebec, supra note 2, j126.
16. Id.9 132.
17. ld. 133.
18. Id. 134.
19. Id. 135.
20. Secession of Quebec, supra note 2, 137.
21. Id. 138.
22. Id. 140.
23. Id. 141.
other countries. The Court, nevertheless, took the view that at present, an act
of unilateral secession would be illegal, even though the illegal act of secession
might eventually lead to a recognized state within the international framework.
The possibility of subsequent legitimacy of the newly created state would not,
in the Court's view, provide a retroactive basis for declaring that a present act
of secession would be legal.24
M. NEW PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE QUEBEC CASE
A. The Right to Secession
Commentators have been asking whether the Quebec decision breaks new
ground for the law of self-determination. I think it does in two ways. First, the
Court by recognizing the right to secession when "a people is blocked from the
meaningful exercise of self-determination internally"25 clearly links self-
determination to secession. This right of secession arises when there is no
meaningful exercise of internal self-determination. The Court, in discussing
"internal self-determination," defines it as "a people's pursuit of its political,
economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state."26 This language comes from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, the
Vienna Declaration, and the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the United Nations.2 The Court does not, however, expand
upon the meaning of political, economic, social, or cultural development. The
Vienna Declaration requires that a government represent "the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind."28 This, together with
the whole backdrop of the United Nations Charter and human rights law
generally, requires equality of representation certainly in the political process
and presumably also in the economic, social, and cultural arenas too. This
much is clear from the Court's opinion. The exact nature of what can be
claimed by "peoples" beyond the democratic right to equal political representa-
tion in the context of self-determination is less clear. We are given no clue to
the content of the pursuit of economic, social or cultural development, or the
minimum necessary level of the facilitation of their exercise.
24. Id. 155.
25. Succession of Quebec, supra note 2, 1 134.
26. Id. 126.
27. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; G.A. Res. 2625, 24 Oct. 1970; Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF. 157/24, 25 June 1993; Declaration on the Occasion of the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations; G.A. Res. 50/6, 9 Nov. 1995.
28. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/CONF. 157/24. 25 June 1993.
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B. The Effectivity Principle
The second way in which the Quebec opinion breaks new ground is its
wise discussion of the "effectivity" principle in law. The Court does not shy
away from recognizing the "after-thought" aspect of legal legitimacy. The law
changes in both neat and not-so-tidy ways. A new norm of international law
can burst on the scene by a new multilateral treaty signed and rapidly ratified
by virtually all states. Such change is neat and clean and satisfies all the legal
niceties. But in the area of "rights," change seldom comes about through such
means except at the end of a process where it may well be possible to declare
the right's existence even before a treaty's confirmation.
Much eighteenth and nineteenth century legal/philosophical debate
centered on trying to define rights. When anyone announced a new right, the
legal philosophers would boldly denounce the claim because it did not fit the
rigid rules laid down by whichever philosophical school was in vogue. The
modern rights philosophers are much happier to recognize that rights are often
statements of a preference for how the world. should be ordered. Such
preferences are not to be dismissed as mere whimsy because it is now firmly
understood that if the particular "right" catches hold of the public's imagination
and enough people, over a long enough time, declare the right to exist, it may
eventually come to exist through the convergence of a variety of norm-creating
mechanisms. The non-governmental organizations, often predominantly
populated with non-lawyers, appreciate this fully - so do political crusaders.29
The development of the concept of self-determination as incorporating a
right of secession under certain circumstances follows the same legal route
from the "ought" to the "is." Kosovo and East Timor are two examples of a
people's "ought" helping to transform a principle into an "is." The Quebec
court understood this "legality follows reality" maxim in the context of self-
determination and its exposition on the "effectivity principle" broke new
ground, not because no one had ever recognized the effectivity principle before,
but because the principle was linked to the specific right of secession in the
context of self-determination.
IV. THE EXAMPLE OF KOSOVO SUPPORTS THE RIGHT TO SECESSION
Alistaire Cooke wrote an enlightening column in March of 1999 where he
described in detail the negotiations of the Versailles Treaty at the end of World
29. Take the statement "Americans have a right to health insurance" as lawyers, we know that is
not true. Indeed, we know that forty-five million Americans have no such insurance. But we also know that
it is really a statement that all Americans ought to have health insurance and, sooner or later, the crusaders
believe they will convince the people and the Congress that they should press for and pass legislation to that
effect, so that the right will exist.
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War I and the redrawing of the map of Europe based in part on Woodrow
Wilson's concept of "self-determination." Cooke calls Wilson's fourteen point
plan "a sublime example what can be called begging the question - which
means taking for granted as having happened what you dearly want to
happen."3 Cooke was convinced that the present break up of Yugoslavia can
be traced to its creation in 1919, together with the creation of the concept of
self-determination.3' The Kosovars were a minority guaranteed protection in
1919 in return for Serbia's being granted sovereignty. It is unclear whether the
Kosovars of 1919 are the same "people" who inhabit Kosovo today. Certainly,
there have been large ethnic shifts in the region since that time. Cooke's
observations are, as ever, astute, but he offers us no alternative to a Wilsonian
utopia.
How should we view the experience of Kosovo in the context of self-
determination? Kosovo certainly was not a colony of Yugoslavia under any
common understanding of the term. The Albanians, who make up over ninety
per cent of the population of Kosovo, certainly have a claim to be a "people"
on the basis of ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. They were, and are,
a group distinct from the ruling dominant Serbian group. They inhabit a
distinct area of territory.32 Their lack of representation in the national
government and their brutal oppression by Milosovic's regime is well
documented. 3 In terms of the Supreme Court of Canada's opinion Kosovo fits
the "extreme circumstances" exception to the general rule against secession.
But, of course, the Kosovo example broke new ground because this was
the first time that a powerful, regional, military force (NATO) threw its weight
in on the side of the oppressed and overrode the rule of no break up of
territorial integrity. The NATO forces violated article 2(4) of the Charter and
no theory of self-defense under article 51 can be credibly advanced to authorize
the invasion. Nor, in my view, can any credible theory of Security Council
permission be supported. The fact that the Security Council rejected a vote to
condemn the NATO invasion3' does not constitute authorization, though it
30. Alistaire Cooke, Letter From America, The Pursuit of Self-Determination, BBC News (visited
Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.bbc.co.uk.com>.
31. See generally Nathaniel Berman, ThE iNTFRNATIONAL LAW OFNATIONALISM: GROUP IDENTrY
AND LEGAL HisTORy, 25 (David Whippman ed. International Law and Ethnic Conflict 1998).
32. See Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE
J. INT'L L. 177 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 843
(1999).
34. Twelve out of fifteen members of the Security Council voted to reject the Russian resolution
of March 26, 1999, condemning the NATO action. The argument has been made that Security Council
Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999), "effectively ratified the NATO action and gave it the Council's support."
Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L at 826 (1999).
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certainly represents the extreme ambivalence of the Council's attitude towards
NATO's action.
In evaluating NATO' s invasion of Yugoslavia, the international law rule
on no use of force absent an armed attack or Security Council authorization and
no intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states came slap up against
the great body of human rights law which sets standards for a government's
treatment of its own people and declares violations of those standards to be
violations of international law, though it does not provide any external
enforcement mechanisms to ensure those rights, absent a state's consent. This
immutable convergence was bound to happen sooner or later and the interna-
tional community is now busy fashioning the rules of justifiable forceful
"humanitarian intervention."3 5 Despite the fact that the Rambouillet Accords
only speak of "autonomy" for Kosovo, no one doubts that Kosovo will become
independent (or possibly merge with Albania) and will not be ruled by Serbia.
What would have happened without NATO? I suspect rather the same
scenario as we are witnessing in Chechnya. The Chechens had some sporadic
success but will, at least for the time being, be crushed. When there is no
credible outside threat from national, regional, or international forces, minority
group claims to secession are seldom successful.
Kosovo is an example of those extreme circumstances giving rise to the
right to unilateral secession enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada. The
fact that secession will no doubt eventually take place will provide one more
case of state practice moving the secession principle towards crystalization of
the norm.
V. THE EXAMPLE OF EAST TIMOR SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF SECESSION
With the fall of President Suharto in Indonesia in 1998, the stage was set
for the possibility of reversing the 1975 invasion of East Timor by Indonesia.
As a result of an extraordinary amount of international attention and pressure,
and through the facilities of the United Nations Secretary-General's Office,
Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement in New York on May 5, 1999,36
agreeing to allow the Secretary-General to arrange for "popular consultation"
' 7
of the East Timorese people by means of a "direct, secret and universal ballot"38
on whether they wished to become part of a special autonomous unit within the
framework of the Republic of Indonesia. In the event that the East Timorese
35. See generally Scan Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving
World Order, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 115 (1996).
36. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question
of East Timor, May 5, 1999, New York [hereinafter Agreement].
37. Id. at art. 2.
38. Id. at art. 1.
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rejected the special autonomous unit, the Indonesian government was to
"terminate its links with East Timor,"39 and there was to be a "peaceful and
orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations... to begin
a process of transition towards independence."'
Amazingly, this process has occurred, although with a heavy toll of loss
of life. Perhaps the paramount error of the agreement was to provide that the
"Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining peace and
security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried
out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence
or interference from any side.""' Everyone now knows that the ballot was not
free from violence and intimidation, but no one doubts that Indonesia would not
have signed the May, 1999 agreement without such a provision, and the people
of East Timor refused, often at great personal cost, to be intimidated.
The events in East Timor do not result in much credit for the international
community. One-quarter of the population of East Timor is dead and, by all
accounts, the country is devastated. Nothing short of massive reconstruction
aid will be necessary to help rebuild East Timor. East Timor then is yet another
example of the lack of adequate international machinery and political will to
prevent patent illegality. There was ample warning of pending disaster4 2 and
the international law was, for once, relatively clear.
East Timor was recognized by the United Nations as a non-self governing
territory and therefore had the right to self-determination in the sense of
secession43 from the colonial power of Portugal. The political reality was,
however, that East Timor had been effectively ruled by Indonesia for a quarter
of a century. The independence of East Timor will be a great victory for the
East Timorese people. It will not set a huge unchartered precedent in
international law if viewed as a case of independence from a colonial power.
Perhaps, however, it is too easy to say that East Timor was a colony and
therefore had the right to self-determination in the sense of independence.
After all, Indonesia had been the defacto government of East Timor for twenty-
four years. If viewed as wresting independence from Indonesia, then the East
Timor example does set a more radical precedent. East Timor would then be
a successful example of a people claiming the right to rule themselves because
they were not fully represented in the Indonesian government, and indeed
suffered gross violations of human rights. The fact that the United Nations was
39. Id. at art. 6.
40. Id.
41. Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 3.
42. See, e.g., Geoffrey Gunn, East Timor and the U.N.: The Case for Intervention (1997).
43. Catriona Drew, The East Timor Popular Consultation: Self-Determination Denied, 4 HUM.
RTS. L. Rev. 3 (1999). Tlis article is published in the University of Wottingham, U.K. Human Rights Law
Review.
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available to broker and, more or less, supervise both the final deal and the vote
and will also provide the. transitional regime, permitted the current outcome.
The cup is both half empty and half full. Viewed as a colony finally
moving to independence, the international community must answer first, for not
resisting and then, for supporting the government who invaded East Timor.
Viewed as a people's successful bid for independence from a non-representa-
tive and repressive government, East Timor moves the norm of self-determina-
tion towards secession, at least when the government does not treat its citizens
equally and practices widespread violations of human rights.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A MECHANISM TO DETERMINE THE RIGHT
TO SECESSION AND TO IMPLEMENT IT
What the world needs is an international mechanism authorized to
determine whether a people has manifested the "extreme circumstances"
outlined in the Supreme Court of Canada's opinion, and if so, we need a body
authorized to implement that decision. As long as those mechanisms are not
there, it will only be in a haphazard conglomeration of circumstances that the
results will follow East Timor or Kosovo and even then with colossal loss of
life. There may be a few national courts, such as the Canadian Supreme Court,
with the necessary impartiality to render such a decision and a few governments
willing to implement decisions in favor of secession, but these will be few and
far between. Kosovo and East Timor must spur us on to create the mechanisms
for peoples to be able to secede. At the moment, we tend to run around picking
up the broken pieces in the hope of salvaging something.
What might these mechanisms look like? First we need an impartial body
that can be appealed to in order to determine the right to secede by peoples
claiming "extreme circumstances." Obviously, the definition of "extreme
circumstances" will have to become much more concrete than it is at present.
Secondly, we need a body with the power to implement any such decision
-granting the right to secede. This body might have a number of functions
ranging from monitoring abuse to supervising plebiscites. These bodies would
clearly begin to crack the barrier that sovereignty and territorial integrity
present to secession. Sovereignty and territorial integrity would begin to be
eclipsed in favor of equality of treatment and the right of self-governance. The
international community has yet to make its views clear that this is the direction
it wishes to pursue, but the Quebec decision and the examples of Kosovo and
East Timor begin to provide the shadow of a useful blueprint.
454
